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OPINION OF THE COURT
_____
LAY, Circuit Judge.
Robert

Taylor

filed

a

Chapter

13

petition

in

the

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on
November 19, 1992.
in Michigan.

He had previously filed a Chapter 13 petition

The Michigan bankruptcy petition was dismissed on

August 26, 1991.

In the Pennsylvania proceedings, the Internal

Revenue Service filed an amended proof of claim for taxes from
1987 and 1988,0 to which Taylor objected on the ground that the
taxes at issue were not entitled to priority status because his
petition in bankruptcy was filed more than three years after the
due date of the relevant tax returns.0
The IRS replied that the three-year lookback period
under

11

U.S.C.

§ 507(a)(7)(A)(i)

was

suspended

during

the

pendency of Taylor's Michigan bankruptcy,0 when an automatic stay
0

The claim was comprised of a secured claim of $600, an unsecured
priority claim of $10,526.54, and an unsecured general claim of
$4,189.43.
0
Taylor's 1987 and 1988 tax returns were the subject of this
dispute. His 1987 tax return was due, by virtue of an extension,
on August 15, 1988.
Thus, four years, three months, and three
days lapsed between the due date of Taylor's 1987 return and the
filing of the Pennsylvania bankruptcy. Taylor's 1988 tax return
was due on April 15, 1989. Thus, three years, seven months, and
four days lapsed between the due date of the 1988 tax return and
the filing of the Pennsylvania bankruptcy.
0
Section 507 provided in relevant part:
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prevented the government from collecting his tax debt.

See 11

U.S.C. § 362(a). The IRS argued that, excluding the period of the
Michigan bankruptcy proceeding, less than three years had lapsed
between the due dates of Taylor's returns and the filing of
Taylor's bankruptcy petition in Pennsylvania.0
The Bankruptcy Court issued an order adopting the IRS's
position.

The court held that the pendency of Taylor's Michigan

bankruptcy proceeding tolled the three-year nondischargeability
period for unpaid taxes.

The district court affirmed, and Taylor

appeals.

(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the
following order:
* * * * * *
(7) Seventh, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units,
only to the extent that such claims are for -(A) a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts -(i) for a taxable year ending on or before the
date of the filing of the petition for which a
return, if required, is last due, including
extensions, after three years before the date of
the filing of the petition; . . . .
The 1994 amendments to § 507 assign the government eighth
priority, but this change is not relevant to our appeal. See 11
U.S.C. § 507(a)(8).
0
Excluding the period of the Michigan bankruptcy proceeding,
roughly two years and seven months had lapsed between the due
date of the 1987 return and the Pennsylvania filing; roughly one
year and ten months had lapsed between the due date of the 1988
return and the Pennsylvania filing.
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DISCUSSION
The parties do not dispute that, but for the suspension
of the three-year lookback period during the pendency of Taylor's
Michigan

bankruptcy

proceeding,

the

IRS's

longer entitled to priority under § 507(a).
a

strict

construction

of

11

U.S.C.

tax

claims

are

no

Taylor contends that

§ 507(a)

warrants

the

conclusion that his earlier bankruptcy proceeding in Michigan did
not suspend the three-year lookback period.

Section 108(c) of

the Bankruptcy Code suspends the limitations periods of certain
nonbankruptcy statutes which create claims against a debtor in
bankruptcy.

11

U.S.C.

§ 108(c).0

Taylor

urges

that

it

is

erroneous to apply § 108(c) and 26 U.S.C. § 6503(h)0 to a concept
0

Section 108(c) provides in relevant part:
Except as provided in section 524 of this title,
if applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a
nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a
period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a
court other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against
the debtor, . . . and such period has not expired
before the date of the filing of the petition, then
such period does not expire until the later of-(1) the end of such period, including any
suspension of such period occurring on or after the
commencement of the case; or

(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or
expiration of the stay under section 362, 922, 1201, or
1301 of this title, as the case may be, with respect to
such claim.
0
26 U.S.C. § 6503(h) provides:
-Cases under Title 11 of the United States Code.
The running of the period of limitations provided in
section 6501 or 6502 on the making of assessments or
collection shall, in a case under title 11 of the
United States Code, be suspended for the period during
which the Secretary is prohibited by reason of such
-4-

other

than

collection

or

assessment

and

solely addresses priority among claims.

notes

that

§ 507(a)

He suggests that, had

Congress intended to grant governmental tax claims preferential
treatment, it would have done so explicitly, because suspending
the lookback period solely for the government creates inequities
among

unsecured

creditors.

Sections

507(a)(3)

and

(4),

for

instance, grant priority status to certain unsecured claims for
wages or benefits earned or arising within 90 or 180 days prior
to filing, respectively.
Taylor

asserts,

those

But if a bankruptcy were dismissed,

expenses

yet

unpaid

would

lose

their

priority status upon the debtor's subsequent filing of a second
bankruptcy petition.0

It is asserted that the government should

enjoy no such advantage.
We disagree.
provision

within

First, the fact that there is no explicit

§ 507(a)(7)(A)(i)

which

tolls

the

three-year

lookback provision during a period when an automatic stay is in
effect under § 362 cannot defeat the statutory purpose of either
the Bankruptcy Code or the Internal Revenue Code.

To limit

§ 507(a) in this regard would lead to absurd results, as the
government would lose its priority claim to back taxes as a
result of the taxpayer's abuse of the bankruptcy process.

case from making the assessment or from collecting and
-(1) for assessment, 60 days thereafter, and
(2) for collection, 6 months thereafter.
Taylor makes this assumption without citing any authority. To
our knowledge, this issue has never been litigated.
0
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Taylor's
overall

proposed

statutory

scheme

interpretation

behind

a

Chapter

also
13

ignores

the

proceeding.

A

bankruptcy court may not confirm a Chapter 13 plan unless it
provides

for

"full

payment

. . .

of

all

priority under section 507" of the Code.
Under

the

then

controlling

claims

entitled

to

11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).

applicable

terms

of

§ 507,

tax

liabilities due not more than three years prior to the debtor's
filing for bankruptcy were given seventh priority.
The

filing

of

the

debtor's

petition

for

relief

§ 507(a).

triggers the

automatic stay as to "any act to collect, assess, or recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement" of
the bankruptcy proceeding. § 362(a)(6).

The stay remains in

effect until the debtor obtains a discharge or the case is closed
or dismissed.

§ 362(c)(2).

No discharge can be issued in a

Chapter 13 case until the debtor completes payments or is granted
a hardship discharge. § 1328(b)(1).0
The IRS was completely barred from collecting its prebankruptcy tax claims during the pendency of the automatic stay
under § 362(a).

No discharge occurred in the earlier Michigan

bankruptcy

proceeding.

discharge,

Congress

By

excepting

intended

to

tax

priorities

"discourage

from

recourse

to

bankruptcy as a facile device for evading tax obligations."

S.

Rep. No. 1158, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N.

2468,

2470

(describing

the

provisions under former Bankruptcy Act).
0

effect

of

similar

It would be an absurd

A hardship discharge does not absolve the debtor of priority tax
obligations. §§ 1328(c)(2), 523(a)(1)(A).
-6-

result if a debtor, rather than obtaining a complete discharge by
paying a priority claim, could avoid the three-year lookback
period

by

voluntarily

dismissing

a

bankruptcy

proceeding

and

thereafter urging that a portion of the three-year period has
lapsed.

Surely Congress did not intend to tie the government's

hands and then chide it for not throwing its stone.
Federal
congressional

tolling

concern

that

provisions
both

in

creditors

general

reflect

generally

and

a
the

government in particular have adequate time to collect their
debts. Section 108(c) of the Bankruptcy Code "extends the statute
of limitations for creditors in actions against the debtor, where
the creditor is hampered from proceeding outside the bankruptcy
court due to the [automatic stay] provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362."
In

re

Brickley,

70

B.R.

113,

115

(Bankr.

9th

Cir.

1986).

Likewise, § 6503(h) of the Internal Revenue Code suspends the tax
collection limitation period while the debtor's assets are in the
custody or control of any court and for an additional six months
after dismissal of the debtor's case.
The House Report's discussion of § 507 clearly assumed
that

the

government's

priority

would

apply

even

though

collection of taxes was stayed. The Report reads:
This priority replaces a similar priority provision now
found in the Bankruptcy Act; the requirement that the
taxes not have been reported is dropped and a time
limit is imposed.
The priority should apply if
assessment or collection is stayed whether or not the
debtor reported the taxes.
Creditors are on notice
that the taxes are being disputed, and the taxing
authority has not had an adequate opportunity to assess
or collect the taxes.
The time limit is imposed
because the taxing authority should not be given
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the

priority for taxes that are unassessed or uncollected
through a lack of due diligence.
H. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1977), reprinted in
1978

U.S.C.C.A.N.

5963,

6151

(emphasis

added)

(footnote

omitted).0
The legislative history of § 507 also sets forth the
reasons the government enjoyed priority status under the former
Bankruptcy Act:
A taxing authority is given preferred treatment because
it is an involuntary creditor of the debtor. It cannot
choose its debtors, nor can it take security in advance
of the time that taxes become due. The Bankruptcy Act
gives the taxing authority three years to pursue
delinquent debtors and obtain secured status.
If a
debtor files bankruptcy before that three-year period
has run, the taxing authority is given a priority in
order to compensate for its temporarily disadvantaged
position.
H. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 190 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6150.0

0

Taylor does not contend his taxes were "uncollected through a
lack of due diligence." Id.
0
Significantly, the House Report continues:
There is an additional reason for the priority.
Because it takes a taxing authority time to locate and
pursue
delinquent
tax
debtors,
taxes
are
made
nondischargeable if they become legally due and owing
within three years before bankruptcy.
An open-ended
dischargeability policy would provide an opportunity
for tax evasion through bankruptcy, by permitting
discharge of tax debts before a taxing authority has an
opportunity to collect any taxes due. The priority is
tied to this nondischargeability provision, in order to
aid the debtor's fresh start.
By granting the
nondischargeable tax a priority, more of it will be
paid in the bankruptcy case, leaving less of a debt for
the debtor after the case.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Section 507 grants a priority for taxes on income that
was taxable before bankruptcy and for which a return is last due
within

three

years

prior

to

the

date

petition.

This

section

simply

provision

under

the

Bankruptcy

old

of

replaced
Act.

the
a

filing

similar

of

the

priority

Bankruptcy

Act,

§§

17(a)(1)(c), 64(a)(4) (then codified, respectively, at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 35(a)(1)(c), 104(a)(4) (1970)).
The time limitations within § 507 merely reflect the
existing limitation periods in income tax cases under 26 U.S.C.
§§ 6501

and

6502,

which

proceedings by § 6503(h).

are

suspended

during

bankruptcy

Congress need not provide an explicit

stay period under § 507 when the three-year limitation period is
otherwise stayed under other provisions of the Act.

Priority

status is directly tied to payment of the government's unsecured
claims and the debtor's discharge.

The three-year limitation

period, stayed under §§ 108(c) and 6503(h) as to assessment and
collection, cannot affect the priority status provided to the
government during a bankruptcy proceeding which did not otherwise
culminate in payment of the government's claims and the attendant
discharge of the debtor.

To hold otherwise would defeat long-

standing congressional concerns over nondischargeability and the
disadvantaged status of the government as to unpaid taxes which
led to enactment of the priority status in the first place.
In enacting § 507(a)(7)(A), Congress sought to strike a
balance between three competing interests:
(1) general creditors, who should not have the funds
available for payment of debts exhausted by an
excessive accumulation of taxes for past years; (2) the
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debtor, whose
burdened with
collector, who
had reasonable
restrained him

"fresh start" should likewise not be
such an accumulation; and (3) the tax
should not lose taxes which he has not
time to collect or which the law has
from collecting.

S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5800.

On the one hand, an accumulation

of stale tax claims would defeat the purpose of rehabilitating
the debtor with a fresh start.
lookback

period

government

is

to

three

unable

to

Accordingly, Congress limited the

years.
choose

On

its

the

other

debtors

or

hand,

the

otherwise

to

protect itself as would a secured creditor, and an open-ended
dischargeability policy would permit the discharge of tax debts
before the government has time to collect.
We deem it obvious that these sections, read together,
evidence a congressional concern to preserve the collectability
of tax claims.

Section 507(a)(7)(A)(i) simply provides priority

as to those taxes which fall within the three-year limitation
period. The extension of time provided within § 108(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code and § 6503(h) of the Internal Revenue Code would
be meaningless if debtors could discharge their tax liability by
filing

successive

observed,

§ 108's

bankruptcies.
incorporation

As
of

the

§ 6503

Ninth

Circuit

"reflects

a

has

policy

determination that it would be unfair to allow the statute [of
limitations] to run against the government's right to enforce a
tax lien when, even if the government did bring suit, it couldn't
collect because it couldn't get at the taxpayer's assets."
West,

5

F.3d

423,

426

(9th

Cir.

1993)

In re

(interpreting

§ 507(a)(7)(A)(ii)) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 114 S.

-10-

Ct. 1830 (1994); see also In re Richards, 994 F.2d 763, 765 (10th
Cir. 1993) (noting that "Congress intended to give the government
the benefit of certain time periods to pursue its collection
efforts") (interpreting § 507(a)(7)(A)(ii)); In re Montoya, 965
F.2d 554, 556 (7th Cir. 1992) (approving Brickley's conclusion
that "such a result would sanction tax avoidance schemes since
debtors could simply file a subsequent bankruptcy petition after
three years had passed and deliberately avoid paying their tax
debts"); Brickley, 70 B.R. at 116 ("Congress did not intend to
allow

tax

avoidance

through

bankruptcy

by

permitting

the

discharge of the debtor before the taxing authority has had a
fair

opportunity

to

collect

taxes

due.").

Federal

law

was

designed to safeguard against tax avoidance.
In summary, it seems clear that Congress intended to
provide

the

government

a

full

and

unimpeded

three

years

to

collect income taxes; it did not intend to leave a loophole for
debtors to engage in tax avoidance, as "the burden of making up
the revenues thus lost must be shifted to other taxpayers."

S.

Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N.

5787,

5800; see

also

United

States

v.

Ron

Pair

Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 243 (1989) (departure from strict
construction

of

"conflict

with

important

state

Bankruptcy
any
or

other

Code

section

federal

is

warranted

of

the

interest,"

or

Code,
"a

if
or

it

would

with

contrary

any
view

suggested by the legislative history") (footnote omitted).0
0

Taylor also contends the government could have protected its
interests during the pendency of the Michigan bankruptcy by
-11-

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.

filing a Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay, which, he
notes, would have been granted upon a showing of cause.
11
U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). As the Ninth Circuit has noted, although in a
different context, this argument "assumes relief from the stay
would have been granted," In re Hunters Run, Ltd. Partnership,
875 F.2d 1425, 1428 (9th Cir. 1989), and would require the
government to do something to perfect its tax lien which the Code
does not require, id.
It is unreasonable to suggest,
particularly after the fact, that the bankruptcy court could have
been expected to grant relief beyond that contemplated by payment
of the government under the installment plan.
-12-

